Marquette Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 2 February 1935

Article 13

Mortgages: Upset Price: Confirmation of Sale
Richard B. Johns

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Richard B. Johns, Mortgages: Upset Price: Confirmation of Sale, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 141 (1935).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol19/iss2/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

No. 2],

RECENT DECISIONS

departure should be considered. This modification was affirmed in Egger v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 329, 234 N.W. 328 (1931), but
but neither case mentioned the necessity for diligent search. Cf. Gardner v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 152 Misc. Rep. 873, 274 N.Y.
Supp. 256 (1934).
In the instant case the court admits that the presence of diligent search
strengthens the inference but holds that because the presumption is one based
on fact the obligation to institute such search can only be imposed upon some
ground of policy. It being true that diligent search is but one measuring stick
used to determine the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to substantiate the
inference, it follows that the omission of the requirement will work no great
harm if other standards are used to maintain sufficiently rigid requirements. It is
submitted, however, that in the later Wisconsin cases the fact of death has been
based on evidence which would not be regarded as sufficient in jurisdictions
requiring diligent search. In White v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 165
Wis. 419, 162 N.W. 441 (1917), cessation of correspondence on the part of the
insured was held sufficient [contra: Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 N.J. Eq. 19, 132
Atl. 237 (1926)] and in Egger v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra,
death was found after seven years absence even though the insured deserted
his family and told them he was going to England [contra: Jessie M. Talbot,
petitioner,250 Mass. 517, 146 N.E. 1 (1925)].
In jurisdictions requiring diligent search the proponent of the inference usually puts forth evidence of soliciting the aid of the police and visiting the
morgues, Wiley v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., et al., 246 Mich. 573,
250 N.W. 313 (1933) ; or making exhaustive inquiries of those likely to hear of
the absentee, Rodskier v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 216 Iowa 121,
248 N.W. 295 (1933) ; and even in some instances, of broadcasting inquiries over
the radio, Fredrickson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 126 Neb. 240, 252
N.W. 802 (1934). None of these means of investigation was employed by the
plaintiff in the instant case.
It seems to be decidedly against the weight of reason to go the step further
and find the death to have occurred shortly after the time of disappearance on
the evidence submitted in the instant case. While there are cases involving practically the same facts and arriving at the same conclusion, generally, they can
be distinguished. In Johnson v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 163
Mo. App. 728, 147 S.W. 510 (1912) there was a very diligent search justifying
the finding that the insured died shortly after his disappearance. In Sovereign
Camp Woodmnen of the World v. Piper, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 222 S.W. 649, a
statutory provision eliminated the necessity for diligent search.
JOHN L. WADDLrON.

MORTGAGES-UPSET

PRICE-CONFIRMATION

OF SAL.-The

defendants, mort-

gagors of certain real estate purchased for speculation in 1927, defaulted upon
an appreciable portion of the interest and all of the taxes after the purchase
date, though circumstances indicated an ability to pay. The plaintiff, in meager
circumstances and unable to support herself, foreclosed the mortgage, bid the
property in at $65 per front foot, moved for confirmation of the sale and a
deficiency judgment of $631.56. The trial court, denying the motion, confirmed a
sale at an upset price of $75 per front foot and a deficiency of $175. Plaintiff
appeals, asserting a wrongful application of equitable powers by the court. On
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appeal, Held, decree reversed. An equity court must consider the equities of a
situation, and has no power to set aside the sale price in a foreclosure action
unless such price is substantially inadequate. Weimer v. Uthus, et al., (Wis.
1934).
Foreclosure by sale theoretically guarantees that the fair value of the mortgaged property will be credited against the mortgage indebtedness. The theory
springs from the assumption that competitive bidding reaches and stops at the
fair valuation of property, and out of this conclusion grew the original rule that
equity courts should not interrupt the normal course of foreclosure proceedings
because of mere inadequacy of sale price. Meehan v. Blodgett, 86 Wis. 511, 57
N.W. 291 (1893). But, where mistake, misapprehension, inadvertance, or similar
factors appear, the question for the court is whether the sale under all circumstances is one which the court, in justice to all parties, should approve. John
Paul Lumber Co. v. Neumeister, 106 Wis. 243, 82 N.W. 144 (1900) ; Griswold v.
Barden, 146 Wis. 35, 130 N.W. 952 (1911); see Kremer v. Thwaits, 105 Wis.
534, 535, 81 N.W. 654, 655 (1900). When the fact of an inadequate price is
coupled with an emergency which operates to prevent competitive bidding, the
court may (1) decline to confirm the sale where the bid is substantially inadequate; (2) establish an upset price before the sale at which price the premises
must be bid as a condition to confirmation; (3) establish the fair value of the
property, where no upset price has been set prior to application for confirmation,
and require that such value be credited upon the foreclosure judgment. Suring
State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N.W. 556 1934). Contra: Kenly v. Huntingdon Bldg Ass'n., Inc., (Md. 1934) 170 At1. 526. But the exercise of these powers must be in contemplation of the rights of both mortgagor and mortgagee.
See Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249 N.W. 844, 846 (1933);
Kremer v. Rule, (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 166, 170. The circumstances of each case
must be considered, and the greater equity must prevail. See Michigan Trust Co.
v. Dutinars,265 Mich. 651, 252 N.W. 478, 479 (1934). An important factor is
whether the premises constitute the home or means of living of the mortgagor,
or are held for speculation. See Virginia Joint Stock Land Bank v. Hudson, 266
Mich. 644, 254 N.W. 234, 238 (1934). Emergency relief will be denied the mortgagor if his earnings or cash balances are such as to enable him to discharge
the mortgage obligation. Foelske v. Stockhausen, (Wis. 1934) 254 N.W. 349.
Where the mortgagor, though able, has made no bona fide effort to retain the
property, nor availed himself of existing emergency relief, the court should not
extricate him from his predicament to the detriment of the mortgagee. See
Virginia Joint Stock Land Bank v. Hudson, supra. If the bid is substantial, and
fairly consistent with present values, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the mortgagee. Michigan Trust Co. v. Dutmars, supra. The present fair value of
property is not based upon past or future worth; it must bear a reasonable relation to the value of the security at the time of sale, and depreciation effected by
present conditions should be born by the mortgagor. See Kremer v. Rule, (Wis.
1934) 257 N.W. 166, 169.
That a court of equity may intervene to prevent a mortgagee from obtaining
title through a grossly inadequate bid, thereby subjecting the mortgagor to an
excessive deficiency judgment, is the doctrine of the Suring State Bank case.
The instant case bears no analogy to this situation. Here the mortgagor, failing
in a speculative venture, attempted to saddle the losses upon the mortgagee.
Though financially able, he made no effort to retain the property, nor did he
vish to assume the obligations incident to emergency relief. The plaintiffs bid
was consistent with the fair value at the time of the sale. In view of these cir-
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cumstances the court declared that the order rejecting the fair bid of the plaintiff, depriving her of a substantial portion of her investment, overriding as it
did the equities of the situation, was an erroneous application of the powers
outlined in the Suring State Bank case.
RICHARD B. JOHNS.
QUASI-CONTRACTS-IMPROVEMENTS TO REALTY.-The defendant-contractor who
had been doing work for the defendant-owners was asked to give his advice and
to estimate on work believed necessary to preserve the shoreline of the defendantowner's property. During the absence of the owners, the contractor built a large
wall completely blocking the beach. The contractor now seeks to recover for the
value of the work done in erecting the wall. The defendant-owners counterclaim
for damages. The trial court found that the owners did not authorize the contractor to build the wall, but permitted the contractor to recover the value of the
work done on the theory of quasi-contract and gave him a lien on the land for the
amount of such recovery. On appeal, Held, judgment reversed. There could be
no recovery in this case on the theory of quasi-contract because the court found
that the owner had not unjustly or inequitably retained a benefit. Dunnebacke
Co. v. Pittman et al., (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 30.
Where a trespasser, under no claim of right or license, constructs improvements on another's land, he cannot recover from the owner, nor can he remove
it, as it becomes part of the property. Fischerv. Johnson, 106 Iowa 181, 76 N.W.
658 (1898) (structure built by. mistake on another's land) ; Schroeder v. Goldsnith, 260 Ill. App. 318 (1932) ; Schiavonie v. Ashton, 269 IIl. App. 386 (1934)
(improvements) ; Mitchell v. Bridgeman, 71 Minn. 360, 74 N.W. 142 (1898)
(house). Contra: Rzeppa v. Seymour, 230 Mich. 439, 203 N.W. 62 (1925) (court
here went so far as to grant relief to a trespasser who built under no claim of
right or license; the owner was given the option of paying for the enhanced
value or of releasing the land to the improver on payment of its fair market
value); Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930). But where
the improver has acted under some claim of right or license, such as a void contract or a void deed, the courts are almost unanimous in allowing a recovery for
the benefits accruing. Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835, 26 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 810 (1909) (a void contract); Casteel v. Pennington, 228 Ky. 206, 14
S.W. (2d) 753 (1929) (a void deed); Blodgett v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 (1871) (a void
sale). Cf. Fischerv. Schum'acher,207 Wis. 10, 238 N.W. 80 (1933) (where terms
of a contract were not complied with). When one renders services for another
which are voluntarily accepted a recovery will be allowed. In re Hughes, Will,
229 App. Div. 614,243 N.Y.Supp. 476 (1930) ; In re Huebner's Will, 138 Misc. Rep.
101,244 N.Y.Supp. 764 (1930) ; Hooper v. 0. M. Coewin Co., 199 Wis. 139, 225 N.W.
822 (1929). Cf. Rolette State Bank v. Rolette County, 56 N.D. 571, 218 N.W.
637 (1928) (recovery denied where services are of such character that no choice
could be exercised). If a finder substantially improves the res without the owner's knowledge he has been allowed a recovery when the improvements were
necessary, Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871). In the instant case the
defendant-owners insisted that they did not desire to retain the wall and demanded that it be removed. The court decided therefore that there was no
unjust or inequitable retention of a benefit; that the wall continued to exist upon
the property was immaterial. It is suggested that if some structure was in fact
necessary to prevent damage to the property, a subsequent expression by the
owners that they did not desire the structure erected should not be sufficient to
defeat a reasonable recovery on the theory of quasi-contract.
ROBERT L. PIPER.

